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I. Introduction
Climate talks in December 2012 in Doha, Qatar, wrapped up lines of negotiation that were begun 
years before in Bali. Negotiators resolved contentious questions about the future of the Kyoto 
Protocol and finally put the constraints of the Bali agenda behind them. Now they will turn to 
developing by 2015 a new agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) to cover the post-2020 period. At the same time, the Major Economics Forum 
(MEF) needs a new thrust of engagement, having developed the Clean Energy Ministerial into an 
enduring venue for technology discussions.1 This momentary opening for new agenda items offers 
an excellent opportunity to expand the dialogue to include technical aspects of the one policy 
approach that would actually address the climate problem cost effectively: pricing carbon and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs).  
Negotiators should take this opportunity to establish a Carbon Pricing Consultation (CPC) process: 
a detailed, pragmatic, and ongoing discussion of the implementation details of domestic cap-and-
trade and GHG taxes. A CPC process would address a glaring gap in climate talks to date. Negotiations 
have tackled national emissions targets, global temperature targets, technology transfer, assistance 
to poor countries for adaptation and mitigation (a.k.a. “finance”), clean energy, forest preservation, 
compensation for countries affected economically by mitigation measures, and many other topics. 
Carbon pricing, however, has received little multilateral attention. It has generally been considered to 
be a national-level policy—to be adopted at the discretion of individual governments—and therefore 
1	 The	 17	major	 economies	 participating	 in	 the	MEF	 are:	Australia,	 Brazil,	 Canada,	 China,	 the	 European	Union,	 France,	
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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together to discuss carbon pricing. A CPC process would provide an opportunity for negotiators, 
as well as the administrators of national pricing policies, to discuss how to induce, practically and 
efficiently, the broad economic shifts required to de-couple emissions and economic activity. 
Why focus on carbon pricing? A carbon price, arising either via a cap-and-trade market or a 
carbon tax, creates broad, efficient incentives to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. Done well, it 
would gradually shift consumer demand, production methods, new investment, and technology 
development towards less emissions-intensive goods and services without unduly burdening 
poor households. A carbon tax or auctioned cap-and-trade allowances can also raise revenue to 
fund government outlays or reduce other, more distortionary, taxes. Finally, a carbon price can 
promote economic growth by replacing less efficient tax, regulatory, and spending policies. For 
these reasons, there is nearly universal agreement among economists that a price on carbon is 
a highly desirable step for reducing the risk of climatic disruption. Most would also agree that to 
be effective in the long run, any significant carbon policy will have to involve a price signal.
Why international consultations? First, outside of finance issues, few countries have sufficiently 
included their finance and trade ministries in climate negotiations. Thus the perspectives and 
expertise most familiar with the economics of market-based emissions approaches have been 
missing in the talks. Second, many countries have recently adopted carbon pricing policies, 
so	 there	 is	 increasing	experience	 to	analyze	and	discuss.	 Third,	 some	countries	 that	have	not	
yet adopted carbon prices, such as the United States, have considerable expertise in efficient 
administration of excise taxes and could provide valuable advice. Fourth, talks to date have 
focused on emissions targets, both collectively and by country, divorcing the dialogue from the 
economic realities of achieving those commitments. It is much easier to reach consensus on the 
goal of containing global mean temperature increases to 2 degrees centigrade than to grapple 
with the potentially high price signals on carbon that would be necessary globally to achieve 
the goal. Until negotiators directly address the levels of economic effort involved and how to 
minimize	the	cost,	collective	commitments	to	stabilization	targets	will	remain	both	theoretical	
and infeasible, however compelling they may be scientifically. Fifth, disparate carbon prices 
across different countries can shift emissions, production, investment, and trade patterns, 
and mutual understanding of these cross-border effects is of interest to all parties. Finally, the 
vehement opposition to the EU’s efforts to price carbon in aviation fuels suggests that unilateral 
approaches to carbon pricing can undermine cooperation and climate policy progress. Not 
3least, it shows the critical relationship between carbon pricing and international commerce and 
bolsters the case that this topic is a natural basis for a new climate diplomacy.
II. Towards Carbon Pricing Consultations
The international community should establish a CPC to provide a much needed place to discuss, 
laud, and understand efforts by countries to price greenhouse gases. It would differ from most 
talks under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in that 
the agenda would focus specifically on administrative, economic, and trade-related aspects of 
policies that price carbon and other GHGs. For example, discussions could include an exchange 
of countries’ views, experience, and methodologies related to:
•	 how cap-and-trade and/or carbon tax systems work administratively;
•	 administration of excise taxes on carbon content of fuels, including ways to identify 
taxable entities, establish a tax base (emissions and sources), set reporting requirements 
for	firms,	track	revenue,	minimize	administrative	costs,	and	ensure	compliance;	
•	 ways	 to	 harmonize	 tax	 administration	 across	 countries	 to	 foster	 compliance	 by	multi-
national firms and prevent tax gaps and double-taxation; 
•	 the potential economic benefits to developing countries of carbon pricing as a low carbon 
growth strategy and efficient revenue instrument;
•	 the environmental and economic effects of alternative carbon tax levels and tax 
trajectories;
•	 mechanisms for managing allowance markets and registries, and distributing allowances 
or allowance auction proceeds;
•	 the design and implementation of border carbon adjustments; 
•	 approaches to taxing carbon in bunker fuels; 
•	 the feasibility of including non-CO2 gases, agriculture-and forest-related emissions, and 
process-related CO2 emissions in a carbon pricing system;
•	 the role of sub-national approaches; 
•	 the macroeconomic and trade impacts of carbon pricing;
•	 the distributional effects of a price on carbon, such as effects on poor households or 
disproportional regional effects, and how to address them;
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products;
•	 experience with the environmental performance of carbon pricing;
•	 other fiscal reforms made in conjunction with carbon pricing (such as budget deficit 
reductions or reductions in other taxes), and their impacts;
•	 approaches to fiscal cushioning (such as reducing other energy taxes while establishing a 
price on carbon); 
•	 how to report on carbon pricing policies so that measures can be compared across 
countries;
•	 the relationship between carbon pricing and other policies, such as energy efficiency 
standards and renewable energy subsidies; and 
•	 efficient implementation of carbon pricing in large, complex, federalist systems. 
The goal of these international discussions would be to build mutual comfort and confidence 
in carbon pricing, share views, prevent disputes and trade disruptions, identify and replicate 
successful approaches, learn from one another’s mistakes, build institutional capacity, and 
generally promote mutual cooperation on serious, economically efficient, measures to mitigate 
emissions. 
The CPC could also consider how to guide resources and activities of existing bilateral consultations, 
multi-lateral development banks, the Green Climate Fund, other institutions, and private sector 
entities towards efficient carbon pricing. One particular option could be to find ways to assist 
developing countries in their efforts to reduce fossil fuel subsidies and adopt a carbon tax or 
cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency already works with China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection to build the institutions 
and infrastructure for sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade programs.2 And the Asian Development Bank 
currently assists its member countries in establishing and enforcing value-added taxes. The CPC 
could discuss whether multilateral technical support, either directly through member agencies 
or through regional development banks, could assist developing countries with similar measures 
for greenhouse-gas emissions trading and carbon excise taxes.
The CPC could also consider ways to enlist existing institutions for analytical support related to 
carbon pricing. For example, the International Monetary Fund recently issued a report on fiscal 
2 For more, see EPA’s Clean Air Markets website:  http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/international/china/index.html
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think through the potential for a carbon tax.3 Likewise, the OECD has prepared an illuminating 
cross-country comparison of energy and carbon pricing approaches.4 The CPC could consider 
ways to expand or target efforts by these institutions to facilitate cooperation on climate change.
It may be possible—and it is desirable—to embed the CPC within the Major Economies Forum, 
the G-20, or other existing forums as much as feasible. The defining characteristic of the CPC, 
distinguishing it from existing clean energy and climate consultations, would be that the finance 
and trade ministries (not the environment and energy ministries) would take the lead. These are 
the ministries charged with international economic relationships, tax administration, and general 
macroeconomic stewardship. Of course, to the extent that environment or energy ministries 
oversee domestic carbon tax or cap-and-trade systems, they would play a role. However, the 
focus of the discussions would be on the technical, administrative, and economic cooperation 
aspects of carbon pricing policies, with minimal attention to whether any particular country’s 
approach would achieve any particular emissions target or other goal. To that end, the typical 
level of engagement within the CPC may best lie below that of the ministerial level, and it should 
include those with technical expertise.
One advantage of this approach is that it would separate the work of the CPC, i.e. the pragmatic 
details of carbon pricing, from divisive issues such as who bears what responsibility for 
collective mitigation goals, who should compensate whom for what, and whose approach is 
more ambitious or moral. These debates, however important, have contributed little to global 
emissions mitigation. Subsequent or parallel efforts can review the adequacy of the price signals 
and	seek	 to	 increase	and/or	harmonize	 them;	 the	CPC	should	 center	on	 relatively	 low-profile	
but critically important administrative and technical policy exchanges by interested countries. 
An underlying premise is that most major emitters have a mutual interest in effective policy 
machinery to price carbon.
One useful outcome of the CPC dialogue could be to shape negotiations under the UNFCCC so 
that countries can supplement their emissions targets with commitments in the form of carbon 
pricing, allowing compliance by either achieving their emissions targets or by demonstrating 
3 Fiscal Policy to Mitigate Climate Change: A Guide for Policymakers, edited by Ian W.H. Parry, Ruud de Mooij, and 
Michael	Keen,	International	Monetary	Fund,	2012.
4 Taxing Energy Use:  A Graphical Analysis,	OECD	Publication,	January	28,	2013.
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reduce the risk of inadvertent stringency or laxity, help achieve and document compliance, and 
allow Parties to compare their efforts transparently. 
III. Why a CPC is in the interests of the United States 
Consultations around mutual efforts to price carbon are clearly in the interests of countries that 
have already adopted or are seriously considering adopting such policies. However, even though 
the United States does not currently price carbon at the federal level, it would also benefit from 
carbon pricing consultations. 
First, an increasing number of U.S. trading partners are adopting carbon pricing, and it is in the 
U.S. interest to follow these developments closely. Carbon taxes have been adopted in Sweden, 
Australia, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and South Africa, and the EU has a major CO2 emissions 
trading system. As mentioned above, India has a small tax on coal, and China is experimenting 
with cap-and-trade measures at the local and regional level for possible expansion nationwide. 
Canada also has several sub-national carbon pricing systems.
To be sure, the magnitude of the price signals and the scope of emissions to which they apply 
vary significantly across and within countries. But gradually more global fossil fuel consumption 
is falling under some sort of carbon pricing policy. The United States should welcome a venue in 
which it can learn from other countries’ efforts, discuss potential economic spillovers and effects 
on international commerce, and foster discussions that could prevent international incidents 
such as the dispute over the EU aviation tax. 
Second, the United States has considerable tax administration and cap-and-trade expertise 
that could highlight potentially successful approaches. Although this experience is not 
climate-related, the United States deploys an efficient and highly compliant excise tax system, 
and it could assist developing country efforts to build their own capacity to tax carbon. For 
example, the United States missed an opportunity to applaud and support India’s recent 
adoption of a small tax on coal. The United States could offer to share its experience in 
administering its similar coal excise tax, which it collects under the Black Lung Benefits 
5 McKibbin, Morris, and Wilcoxen (2012) outline just such an approach. http://www.brookings.edu/research/
papers/2012/07/carbon-tax-mckibbin-morris-wilcoxen. 
7Act of 1977. The United States also has long experience with cap-and-trade systems for 
criteria air pollutants, much of which is transferable to greenhouse-gas emissions trading. 
 
Finally, one key impediment to carbon pricing in the United States is the concern that if the 
United States prices carbon and other major emitters do not, then U.S. climate efforts will harm 
its economy to little environmental benefit. An international venue to discuss carbon pricing 
policies among major emitters could fruitfully evolve into a place to address such concerns and 
coordinate,	if	not	fully	harmonize,	carbon	price	signals.
IV. Next Steps
As a way forward, we recommend that at their next meeting this spring in Washington, MEF 
members discuss their preliminary views around the potential for carbon pricing consultations 
and options for CPC agenda items for future MEF meetings. Australia, given its experience in 
carbon pricing design, could also propose a CPC agenda item for the G-20 meetings that it will 
host in Brisbane next year. Discussions within the MEF and G20 could explore whether members 
believe a CPC agenda item would be productive within the UNFCCC process.
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